If Europe does not rapidly build its own industrial and military capacity, we risk weakening both our security and the transatlantic link. A stronger Europe is a prerequisite for a strong Nato.
The reactivated Swedish Defense Commission is operating in a fundamentally transformed security policy landscape. Europe’s security can no longer rest on institutions created in the 20th century or on the assumption of permanent American dominance. For Sweden, this means that national rearmament must be understood in a broader European context.
What we are witnessing is not a temporary uncertainty, but a structural shift. For three decades, Europe has relied on the notion that economic integration, trade, and rule-based systems in themselves create security. That idea is now being tested in the current geopolitical landscape.
The long-term trends are clear: Europe’s relative demographic decline, the global economy’s center of gravity shifting eastward, climate-related instability, and technological developments that dramatically shorten decision-making windows during crises. Hypersonic systems, AI-driven cyber warfare, and autonomous platforms mean that time horizons once measured in months or years are now measured in minutes.
In this landscape, Europe’s security architecture, created in the 20th century, is structurally deficient. National vetoes, fragmented chains of command, and slow decision-making processes are ill-suited to handle a reality where speed, integration, and industrial scale are decisive.
Today, Europe is an economic and regulatory power, but an incomplete security actor. Nato therefore serves a vital function and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. But Nato ultimately relies on American capabilities and political will. A Europe that lacks its own industrial and operational weight risks becoming a passive free rider of security. This is where the defense-industrial dimension becomes critical.
Europe has already demonstrated its technological and industrial expertise through advanced satellite systems, a world-leading aerospace industry, and strong research environments. We have engineering talent, capital, and industrial base. What is lacking is scale, integration, and collective prioritization.
Building up Europe’s defense-industrial capacity is not a project directed against the United States. On the contrary. The transatlantic link is not weakened by a stronger Europe, it is weakened by a weak Europe. A more capable Europe is a more significant and equal partner. Collective responsibility strengthens alliances.
The regionalization of critical value chains in defense, energy, and technology is a necessary response to a more fragmented global economy. But regionalization must not be confused with protectionism. The prosperity of Sweden and Europe has been built on openness and trade. That course should continue, while reducing strategically critical dependencies.
At the same time, Europe must be open to deeper technological cooperation with strategic partners. No single actor can maintain both a technological edge and breadth across the entire modern defense spectrum. Building a stronger European industrial base therefore does not mean closing the door, but rather choosing partnerships that strengthen our own capacity and reduce vulnerabilities. Strategic technological partnerships will be an essential part of Europe’s long-term security and industrial policy.
To realize Europe’s potential, joint large-scale investments and a greater degree of coordination in procurement, research, and technological development are required. If the majority of rapidly expanding national defense budgets continue to be spent without European coordination, we will miss a historic opportunity to build real strategic capability.
For Sweden, this means that the work of the Defense Commission must be linked to a broader European strategy. Swedish rearmament should also strengthen Europe’s collective capacity and thereby Nato as well.
History has no mercy for political entities that are wealthy yet incapable of defending themselves. But it is equally merciless towards those who isolate themselves from their strongest allies out of fear. Europe must therefore rapidly enhance its own industrial and military capabilities, while also deepening the transatlantic cooperation.
A stronger Europe and a strong United States are far more potent as a deterrent together than the current imbalance. The question is not whether Europe will change. The question is whether we will do so in time.
Jan Pie, Senior Advisor
This insight was published as an op-ed in Dagens industri on February 25: https://www.di.se/debatt/europa-kan-inte-forsvaras-med-1900-talets-institutioner/
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